Turkey After Erdoğan: Why Democratic Transition Matters
By Rachel Avraham
For more than two decades, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has dominated Turkish politics to such an extent that the country’s institutions, foreign policy and political identity are often discussed through the lens of one man. His supporters credit him with expanding Turkey’s regional influence, strengthening its defense industry, and overseeing major infrastructure projects. His critics point to the concentration of executive power, pressure on political opponents, and the weakening of institutional checks. Both assessments are part of the record. The more important question now is what Turkey will look like when the Erdoğan era eventually ends.
That question belongs first to Turkish citizens. No government in Washington, Brussels, or Jerusalem has the right to choose Turkey’s leadership, and any legitimate political transition must come through elections and constitutional institutions. In this context, change should not mean upheaval or outside intervention. It means restoring a political culture in which governments can lose office without the state itself appearing to be at risk.
Turkey still has elections, opposition parties, competitive politics, and a public that remains deeply engaged in national affairs. Yet the political environment has become increasingly unequal. Executive authority has expanded, opposition politicians have faced legal pressure, with many still in jail, and confidence in judicial independence has weakened. Democracy is not only the existence of a ballot box; it also depends on whether competing parties can organize, speak and campaign under rules that do not change according to the needs of those already in
power.
A peaceful transfer of power would therefore matter, even if the next government disappointed many of Erdoğan’s opponents. It would show that Turkey’s political system can survive the departure of its most dominant leader in generations. For a republic with strong institutions, leaders are temporary. The ability to replace them is not a sign of weakness, but evidence that the state is larger than the person who happens to occupy the presidency.
There are economic reasons for wanting that stability as well. Turkey remains one of the region’s most important economies, with a large industrial base, significant manufacturing capacity, a major tourism sector, and unusually strong connections to European markets. Its geographical position gives it advantages few countries possess. At the same time, long-term investment depends heavily on confidence in the legal system, predictable economic policy, and institutions that function independently of political pressure. A political transition would not solve inflation, unemployment, or structural economic problems overnight, but it could create an opportunity to rebuild confidence that has been damaged by years of uncertainty.
The same applies to Turkey’s relationship with the United States. Ankara is too strategically important to be treated as an ordinary NATO ally. It controls access between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and sits beside some of the world’s most unstable regions. Its military weight, role in the Caucasus, and involvement in Syria make it impossible for Washington to ignore. Yet the relationship has become increasingly difficult to manage. The dispute over Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 system, disagreements over Kurdish forces in Syria, and repeated clashes over regional priorities have left both governments cooperating where necessary, while often distrusting each other.
A different government in Ankara would not suddenly become obedient to Washington, and that should not be the expectation. Turkish nationalism and the desire for strategic independence extend well beyond Erdoğan. What could change is the way disagreements are handled. Foreign policy built through durable institutions is generally easier to predict than policy that depends heavily on the instincts and political needs of a single leader. For allies, predictability matters almost as much as agreement.
Europe faces a similar problem. Turkey and Europe are tied together by trade, migration, energy, security and geography, regardless of what happens to the long-stalled EU membership process. European governments have often criticized democratic decline inside Turkey while continuing to rely on Ankara for practical cooperation. That contradiction has become part of the relationship. A more open political environment in Turkey would not erase the disputes between the two sides, but it could make cooperation less transactional and restore some of the political confidence that has disappeared over the past decade.
Israel presents perhaps the clearest example of how dramatically Turkish foreign policy has changed. The two countries once managed a relationship based on trade, tourism, military cooperation and pragmatic diplomacy even while disagreeing sharply over the so-called Palestinians. That balance has deteriorated badly. Erdoğan has made confrontation with Israel an increasingly visible part of Turkish regional politics, and the deterioration has moved well beyond hostile speeches.
Turkey halted direct trade with Israel in 2024 and has backed legal and diplomatic pressure against Israeli leaders. Ankara’s relationship with Hamas has remained a major source of Israeli concern. More recently, Turkey has pursued additional legal measures against Israeli officials while the rivalry between the two countries has grown more complicated in Syria. What was once primarily a political dispute now carries the risk of military miscalculation.That development should worry Ankara as much as Jerusalem. Turkey and Israel do not need to agree about Gaza, Palestinian statehood or the conduct of Israeli governments. Turkish sympathy for so-called Palestinians is deeply rooted and will remain part of the country’s politics after Erdoğan. Any future government is likely to criticize Israel, perhaps harshly. Expecting a new Turkish leadership simply to return to the relationship of the 1990s would be unrealistic.
But criticism does not have to become permanent strategic hostility. A future government could support Palestinian aspirations while maintaining normal diplomatic channels with Israel. It could oppose Israeli military policy without treating confrontation with Jerusalem as an organizing principle of Turkish foreign policy. It could compete with Israel for regional influence while recognizing that neither country gains from turning the other into a long-term enemy.
Syria makes that distinction increasingly urgent. Turkey has expanded its influence there, while Israel views developments close to its northern security environment through a very different lens. When two powerful militaries operate in overlapping spaces without sufficient trust, accidents can become crises. The fact that outside powers have an interest in preventing Turkish-Israeli escalation shows how much the relationship has changed. A more institutional and less personalized foreign policy in Ankara could make such risks easier to contain.
Turkey itself would benefit from reducing the number of strategic disputes it carries at the same time. It already has to manage Russia to the north, Iran to the east, instability in Syria and Iraq, tensions in the eastern Mediterranean and difficult relations with parts of Europe. Adding a permanent confrontation with Israel does not strengthen Turkey simply because the rhetoric surrounding it is popular domestically.
None of this means that Erdoğan’s departure would transform Turkish politics overnight. His political era has lasted too long and shaped too much for that. Turkish nationalism will remain strong. Skepticism toward the United States and Europe will not disappear. Support for “Palestinians” will remain widespread, and future governments will continue to pursue an independent regional role. A democratic transition should not be judged by whether the next president agrees with Washington, Brussels or Jerusalem.
The real test is simpler. Can Turkey return to a political system in which a leader can lose power without institutions bending around the transition? Can courts regain greater independence, opposition parties compete without extraordinary pressure and foreign policy become less dependent on domestic political theater? Those are questions about Turkey’s own strength, not about satisfying foreign governments. Can the next leader shed dysfunctional Islamism?
A country of Turkey’s size and history does not need an indispensable leader. It needs institutions capable of surviving every leader. If Turkish voters eventually choose a new political direction through a genuinely competitive democratic process, America would gain a more predictable NATO partner, Europe would have greater reason to rebuild political trust and Israel could find space to turn an increasingly dangerous rivalry back into manageable disagreement. None of those outcomes is guaranteed. What would matter most is something more basic: Turkey would have proved that its republic is strong enough to change governments without losing itself in the process.
Democracy in Turkey can also be strengthened if Ambassador Tom Barrack is removed from his position. He is too cozy with Erdogan and not doing anything to encourage the democratic opposition within Turkey. He also encourages Erdogan’s anti-Israel rhetoric, which threatens regional stability. The Trump administration should consider replacing him with someone who will do more to ignite a resurrection of the Gezi Park protest movement, which would greatly enhance a de-escalation in tensions between Jerusalem and Ankara.
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